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THE COLORADO SECURITIES LAW
By ERNEST
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LOHr

Ernest W. Lohf received his A.B. degree from Harvard University in 1950 and
his LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School in 1953. He was admitted to
practice in Colorado in 1956; is a partner in the Denver firm of Keller,
Bloomenthal & Lohf and a member of the Denver, Colorado and American
Bar Associations.
Generally speaking, securities regulation in Colorado has as its
statutory base Chapter 125 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which inchides the Securities Law,' the Fraudulent Practice Law,' the Anti-bucketing Law' and other provisions relating to investment contracts' and
false statements regarding the value of securities.' An exhaustive analysis would extend to certain other statutory provisions which, at least
formally, pertain to non-securities matters, e g., insurance." This article
is limited, however, to the Securities Law.
SOsIME PREIIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

The Securities Law must be viewed from a realistic perspective
placing it in the national context of securities regulation. At the federal
level the principal landmark is, of course, the Securities Act of 1933,"
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The federal
regulation (in theory, entirely; as a practical matter, one may have reservations) is based on the so-called disclosure philosophy: any and every
security, even the utterly worthless, may be offered and sold if all facts
material to an intelligent investment decision are completely and accurately disclosed to prospective purchasers.' It is of considerable practical significance that the federal regulation is generally uniforma throughout the country and has a centralized administration. The attorney attempting to comply with the federal act ordinarily deals with at mtost
two offices: the \'\ashington, 1). C., office of the SEC and one of its
regional offices.
In contrast, securLities regulation at the state level" ranges from none
of significance in Nevada and Delaware" through relatively simple
regulatory systems (e.g., New York" and New Jersey'1) providing for
Colo. Rev. Star. §§ 125-1-1 to -19 (Supp. 1957).
2 1d. §§ 125-2-1 to -15.
:1Id. §§ 125-6-1 to -8.
4 Id. §§ 125-3-1 to -6.
5
5 Id. §§ 125-5-1 and -2.
Id. §§ 72-1-44.
48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
9§ 77b-77v (Supp. IV, 1957).
"Congress did not take away from the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a
fool of himself.' It simply attempted to prevent others from making a fool of him."
Loss, Securities Regulation 82 (1951).
The most recent, and the best, discussion of state securities legislation is Loss
and Cowett, Blue Sky Law (1958), which also contains a bibliography of blue sky
literature and lists of blue sky cases, both arranged by states.
10 A one-sentence anti-fraud statute of 1931, Del. Rev. Code § 4369 (1935), was
omitted from Delaware Code 1953.
"1 N.Y.
Gen. Bus. L. Art. 23-A, § 352. The New York statutes also impose relatively simple filing requirements, in effect elementary forms of dealer and securities
registration, as an adjunct to the anti-fraud provisions. Id. § 359-e. See note 13 infra.
"2 N.J. Rev. Stat., Tit. 49 (1937).
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enforcement of anti-fraud statutes by the state attorney general,- to
highly complex, often vigorously enforced, paternalistic administrative
mechanisms (e.g., California'") providing for detailed supervision of:
fraudulent practices, registration of securities, licensing of dealers and
salesmen and civil liabilities."' Insofar as states have developed systems
of securities regulation and, in particular, registration of securities, the
underlying philosophy is almost universally the so-called regulatory.
philosophy: it is the prerogative, indeed the duty, of the state securities
administrator to determine, on the basis of generally vague statutory
standards, " which proposed public offerings have merit (and therefore
can be permitted to be offered and sold) and which have none or not
enough (and therefore must be prohibited from ever reaching the market place) . Disclosure of all material facts to prospective investors is,
of itself, insufficient to make the offer and sale of securities lawful.
The attorney attempting to blue sky an offering must, of course,
assume the risk that such judgment as to value or nerit by one or more
state administrators will be something less than adequate. In addition,
he must cope with practical problems stemming from widespread variations from state to state in definitions of basic terms (e.g., "security"
1' Anti-fraud provisions, as such, do not require filings with, or the securing of
permits from, a state official; they merely authorize official action (investigation,
injunction and prosecution) in connection with apparently fraudulent conduct.
14 Cal. Corp. Code, Tit. 4. Div. 1. as amended by L. 1957, c. 139, 169, 170, 669.
'5 State blue sky legislation generally exemplifies one or more of three basic regulatory techniques: (1) regulation of fraudulent practices independently of any licensing system; (2) registration, licensing and supervision of broker-dealers and other
persons engaged in the securities businss; and (3) registration of securities. A few
states adopt only one or two of the three basic techniques. The typical blue sky law,
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-7, -15, -17,
however, contains all types of provisions. E.g., Uah
-24 (1953).
16 The standards are commonly so broadly phrased that the state administrator's
power to approve or disapprove of an offering, or to impose conditions precedent to
the granting of a permit, has no limitations of practical significance. Thus the California Commissioner must find that the "proposed plan of business . . . and the proposed issuance of securities are fair, just, and equitable, that the applicant intends
to transact its business fairly and honestly, and that the securities that it proposes
to issue and the method to be used by it in issuing or disposing of them are not such
" Cal. Corp. Code, Tit. 4,
as, in his opinion, will work a fraud upon the purchaser ....
Div. 1, § 25507. Other standards include, in Utah, that the enterprise must not be
based on "unsound business principles" (Utah Code Ann. § 66-1-11 (1953)); in New
Mexico, that the Commissioner, after investigation of the condition of the issuer and
value of its securities, be "satisfied" that "the sale of such securities should be permitted" (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-18-24 (1953)), with more specific standards governing
revocation of permits (ibid.).
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and "sale") ; in coverage of the acts and extent of exemptions; in application forms (on which substantially the same information generally
Must be submitted) ; in statutory standards to be applied by administrators: in interpretation of identical statutory language; in the extent
to which substantially identical statutes are enforced; in unpublished,
ad hoc administrative rules of thumb and practices arising out of' exigencies of budget and manpower in a particular state; and in predilections of individual administrators?
The mere co-existence of diverse, technical federal and state securities laws, both imposing detailed and substantial filing requirements,
proclaims the necessity for uniformity of the state laws and their coordination with the federal legislation. Nevertheless, progress toward
those goals has been slow." A new Uilor11 Securities Act,' " approved in
1956, represents the most promising attempt thus far to provide a workable solution to the uniformity-coordination problenm. The Act has been
favorably received in a number of states, including Colorado, and will
be considered in greater detail shortly.
HISTORY OF THE SlCURITIEs LAW

Colorado did not contribute to the flood of blue sky legislation
which soon followed enactment of the first thorough-going blue sky law
in Kansas in 1911.21 It was not until 1923 that the Colorado legislators
enacted "The Securities Act,"" which to a very great extent is identical
with the present statute. The fact that Colorado did not climb on the
blue sky bandwagon until 1923 is not particularly remarkable, but it is
significant that the Colorado legislation represented a departure from
the regulatory philosophy which already had become the traditional
approach of securities legislation in the various states.
The 1923 Act provided no statutory merit standards which had to
be satisfied prior to offer and sale of securities, nor did it require that
any permit be obtained prior to an offer or sale. The heart of the Act
'7 "No two state acts are identical. And the amount of variation
and frequently
unnecessary complexity in both substance and verbiage is staggering. For example,
when all the permutations are charted, there are some 2800 exemptions in the fortyseven statutes." Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 18-19 (1958); see also pp. 35-36,
43-46, 62-64, 67-83.
18A Uniform Sale of Securities Act, 9 U.L.A. 65, approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association
in 1929, became outdated with passage of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and never
was enacted to any substantial extent (see Loss, Securities Regulation 45 (1951 with
1955 Supp.)). The National Association of Securities Administrators subsequently
secured adoption in some states of uniform application and other forms (id. 45-46).
Until recently, however, the most important contribution was enactment in a number
of states of provisions permitting the filing of an SEC registration statement or
prospectus in lieu of information required under state law, e.g.. Ariz. Rev. Stal.
§ 44-1896 (1956) (federal prospectus or offering circular may be accepted in lieu of
state prospectus upon finding "nature and scop'e of the information disclosed"
is
-substantially equivalent'). And ordinarily state administrators are cooperative in
informally permitting questions on state forms to be answered by cross-reference
to a federal registration statement, prospectus, or offering circular. Despite the .foregoing contributions toward iniformity and coordination, however, the basic problem
is far from solved.
1" 9C U.L.A. 86 (1957); Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 245 (1958).
20 Kan. L. 1911, c 133. The Kansas statute, both in its original and present form,
is an example par excellence of the strict regulatory approach to securities registration designed to shield "gullible, unsophisticated investors" from "slick promotional
schemes." During the period 1911 to 1913, 23 states enacted blue sky laws, all but six
of which were identical with the Kansas statute or modeled upon it. See Loss and
Cowett. Blue Sky Law 10 (1958).
21 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1923, c. 16S.
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was section 4: "Every issuer of securities, within twelve (12) months
next before selling or offering for sale, any security or securities, . . .
shall issue a prospectus . . . containing specified inlformation. Section
6 required two copies of such "prospectus" to be filed with the Secretary
of State. Section 7 required that advertisements and selling literature
''shall contain a reference to this Act, and shall mention the date of the
prospectus and the fact that such prospectus, relating to the securities
offered, has been filed in accordance with the terms hereof and is open
to public inspection," and shall include an offer to send, to any person
requesting same, a copy of such prospectus by mail." Section 8 provided for civil liabilities and included the following provision: "Every
person acquiring any security offered to the public, upon compliance
with the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed to rely upon all, and
only, such representations and statements as are set forth in the prospectus relating to such security." The statute by its terms embodied the
disclosure, as opposed to the regulatory, philosophy later exemplified
in greater detail in the Federal Securities Act of 1933. The Colorado
statute is unique among blue sky laws in adopting the disclosure approach to registration of securities generally.-"
In 1931 the Colorado legislature enacted the Fraudulent Practice
Act,2 ' in effect a supplement to the 1923 legislation, containing provisions for registration of dealers and salesmen and anti-fraud provisions.
The 1931 Act also amplified the information to be included in prospectuses filed under the Securities Act, required the filing of a supplemental
prospectus upon any substantial change of material fact, and made it
the duty of the issuer to deliver a copy of the prospectus to persons making written request therefor. A 1953 amendment of the Securities Act
furthered federal-siate coordination by authorizing issuance, publication
and circulation of a preliminary prospectus or identifying statement
filed under the Securities Act of 1933.22 After further minor amendment
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-17 (Supp. 1957)
now provides: "It shall be unlawful to
)rint in any solicitation, advertisement, letter, message, postcard, circular, pamphlet,
newspaper or periodical wherein any security is tendered, directly or indirectly, for
sale or delivery, or wherein any subscription or order for any security is solicited
any mention or reference to the fact that any registration statement has been filed
as required by 'The Securities Law,' unless immediately following such statement.
and in type at least as large as the type used in printing such statement, there be
printed the following: 'Such filing is not an approval, recommendation or guaranty
of such security by the state of Colorado or any of its officials.' " Further, § 125-1-16
makes it unlawful "to print upon any security any statement that the registration
statement or any document required by 'The Securities Law' has been filed .... "
25 Some states have adopted the disclosure approach in a piecemeal fashion as to
certain securities only. In 1903 Connecticut established a rudimentary disclosure-type
form of registration of mining and oil securities (Conn. Pub. Acts 1903-05, c. 196)
which was replaced by a regulatory-type statute in 1911 (Conn. Pub. Acts 1911, c.
232). Nevada (which today has no blue sky law) followed suit in 1909 with a statute
requiring filing of information relating to mining securities (Nev. Stat. 1909, c. 56),
later watered down in 1911 (Nev. Stat. 1911, c. 202) and repealed in 1915 (Nev. Stat.
1915, c. 49). The Idaho statute, basically of the regulatory type, does not apply to
issuers "engaged in actual mining operations developing mining property within the
state," the term "actual mining operations'
excluding "development or production
of gas or oil," (Idaho Code § 26-1916 (1947)) and special disclosure-type provisions
(id. §§ 26-1817 to -21) apply to such exempted mining issuers. Similarly, the Washington "Mining Act," Wash. Rev. Code, c. 21.08 (1951) (applying to any "corporation
engaged or proposing to engage in the metalliferous mining industry and desiring to
issue or sell . . . securities issued by it,
to more than twenty residents of the
state . ,"
id. § 21.08.020) and the "Oil and Mining Leases Act," id. c. 21.12 applicable to mining leases ("any instrument conveying title to . . . metalliferous, or nonmetalliferous rights or real property, exclusive of title to the property," id. § 21.12.010)
and their public sale ("an offering of three or more leases to residents of the state."
ibid.), embody the disclosure philosophy in contrast to the Washington general, regulatory-type blue sky law, the "Securities Act." id. c. 21.04.
24 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1931, c. 95.
25 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1953. c. 214.
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in 1955,' the Securities Act was last amended in 1957.
The 1957
amendment supplied the present name, "The Securities Law," and enacted a significant portion of the latest Uniform Securities Act.
THE UNIFORM SECURITIEs ACT

At the request of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Harvard Law School in 1954 began a two-year, intensive study of state securities regulation, conducted by Professor Louis
Loss and Edward M. Cowett. The results were two: a new Uniform
Securities Act" and a treatise by Messrs. Loss and Cowett, "Blue Sky
Law."
Part I of' the new Uniform Act covers fraudulent and other prohibited practices: Part 11 provides [1- registration ol broker-dealers,
agents and investment a(visors; Part I II covers registration of securities;
and Part IV sets forth provisions of general ap)plical)ility. The different
parts of the Act reflect a basic classification of' existing laws, provisions
contained therein and regulatory techniques into (a1) regulation of
fraudulent practices independently of any licensing system, (b) registration, licensing and Supervision of broker-dealers and other persons
engaged in the securities business, and (c) registration of securities.
The Act makes no provision, however, for disclosure-type registration.
The Act adopts a novel approach: in a general way it is a restatement of
" Colo. L1aws 1st leg.
Sess. 1955. c. 285.
Colo. 1aws 1st Deg. Sess. 1957, c. 243.
28 9C U. L.A. 86 (1957): loss and Cowett, I flue Sky La\
21
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Iexisting law, the separate parts of which can be enacted alone or in any

combination. The rationale of that approach is that absolute uniformity
is an impractical goal where existing legislation to such a very great
extent is characterized by diversity both in detail and basic regulatory
techniques. "
Part III of the Uniform Act, relating to registration of securities, is,
of course, of particular interest here. Three registration procedures are
219See Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 236 (1958). Appendices A, B and C to the
Act provide detailed instructions for accommodation of the Act to deletion of various
provisions.

for
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established: notification, " coordination " and qualification.- Part III
is an excellent illustration of the general approach of the draftsmen, who,
although attempting wherever practicable to adhere to and unify existing law, nevertheless did not "limit themselves to discovering the cowpaths and following them."3 3 Registration of securities by notification
or qualification was, to a considerable extent, characteristic of existing
legislation at the time the Act was drafted."4 The former is essentially
a simplified type of registration available only to "high-quality" offerings;" the latter is a detailed, "long-form" type registration available for
any security." Registration by coordination, however, is a statutory innovation and provides a simplified registration procedure for any security
as to which a registration statement has been filed under the Securities
Act of 1933 in connection with the same offering."
Under the registration by coordination procedure, the state filing
consists merely of three copies of the prospectus and amendments filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act
of 1933, and, if requested by the state administrator, copies of other documents and information so filed, together with an undertaking to forward all amendments of the federal registration statement promptly.
The state registration becomes effective at the moment the federal registration statement becomes effective if (1) no stop order or other proceeding under state law is pending, (2) the state registration statement
30 § 302 (9C U.L.A. 101 (1957)).
31 § 303 (9C U.L.A. 104 (1957)).
32 § 304 (9C U.L.A. 107 (1957)).
33 Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 237 (195S).
31 Twenty-five statutes then provided for registration by notification (sometimes
called "description") and qualification (or "application"). Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky
Law 286 (1958).
35 The Arizona requirements for registration by descripton are as typical as any:
the issuer must have been in continuous operation for at least three years and for
three of the five years immediately prior to registration must have had annual net
earnings (1)
in case of interst-bearing securities, not less than 115 times annual
interest thereon and on all interest-bearing securities of equal rank, (2) in case of
securities having a specified dividend rate, not less than 11h times annual dividend
requirements thereon and on all outstanding securities of equal rank, and (3) in case
of other securities, not less than 5% upon all outsttnding securities of equal rank,
including those propcsed to be offered. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1871 (1956).
36 E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1891 to -1900 (1956).
37 The draftsmen consider the provisions for registration by coordination as "perhaps the most important reform in the entire statute." Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky
Law 242 (1958). And if legislative results are a valid indication that judgment is
sound; for the registration by coordination provisions thus far apparently have been
2'eceived more favorably than any other portion of the new Act. They have beer,
enacted in substance or verbatim in Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4(1) (Supp.
1957)), Hawaii (Hawaii Rev. L. § 199-8 (1955)), Kansas (Kan. L. 1957, S.B. No. 145.
§ 6). New Mexico (N. M. Stat. Ann. § 48-18-19(B) (Supp. 1957)), Texas (Tex. L. 1957,
S.13. No. 294, § 7(C) and Virginia (Va. Code 1950 § 13.1-509 as amended by Laws 1956
c. 428), although New Mexico omits the automatic effectiveness provision. Certainly
registration by coordination is a very substantial step toward effective federal-state
coordination. But the same or a. simila1 ' procedure well could have been extended to
securities offered under the federal Regulation A (17 C.F.R. § 230, 251-62 (Supp. 1957))
even though admittedly Regulation A technically is an exemption from registration
under the Securities Act of 1933 and not in all respects the equivalent of registration
thereunder. Regulation A requirements have tended more and more, as a practical
matter, to become tantamount to registration. The information available to investors,
and to state administrators, from a Regulation A offering circular tends to be substantially the same as would be available from a registration statement prospectus
without exhibits; and the state administrator still has ample authority to require
additional information. And a number of state statutes before advent of the new
Uniform Securities Act permitted a. federal offering circular (apparently meaning a
Regulation A offering circular as distinguished from a registration statement prospectus) to be filed under state law in lieu of information otherwise required by state
application forms, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1896 (1956).
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has been on file at least ten days, and (3) a statement of the maximum
and minimum offering prices and underwriting discounts and commissions has been on file with the state at least two days. 8
But registration by coordination does not in effect exempt from
state law securities for which a federal registration statement has been
filed. In this connection, it is particularly noteworthy that Part III of
the Uniform Securities Act proceeds upon the regulatory philosophy.
The other types of registration (notification and qualification) are traditionally found only in a regulatory-type statute involving application
to the offering by the state administrator of the particular merit standards recognized by state law. In Part III of the Act, section 306 (a),
which applies to all three types of registration, authorizes the administrator by order to deny, suspend or revoke effectiveness of any state registration upon finding (I) that the order is in the public interest and
(2) that any one of nine substantive grounds for such order exist. Such
substantive grounds "are a cross-section of the existing standards"" and
include " (E) the offering has worked or tended to worka fraud upon
purchasers or would so operate" and " (F) the offering has been or would
be made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' profits or
participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of options." With this
background, let us turn to the 1957 amendment of the Colorado statute.
3s § 303 (9C U.LA. 104 (1957)).
39 Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 327

(1958).
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AMENDMENT

The 1957 amendment'" to "The Securities Act" changed its name to
"The Securities Law" and made another change in basic terminology:
the issuer no longer files a "prospectus" but instead files a "registration
statement." The latter change adopts the terminology of the Uniform
Securities Act.
The Colorado legislature also adopted verbatim the basic securities
registration requirement of the Uniform Act that "It is unlawful for any
person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it is registered . . .
or the security or transaction is exempt .... .'"' But Colorado added to
that requirement an additional sentence: "A security may be registered
by qualification or coordination."'' The addition would appear to indicate that Colorado has accepted two of the registration procedures under
the Uniform Act-coordination and qualification-and has rejected the
third-notification. As will be noted later, however, the word "qualification" has decidedly different connotations under the Colorado statute
than under the Uniform Act.
The 1957 Colorado amendments substantially adopt the registration by coordination provisions of the Uniform Act, the most significant
variation being that Colorado requires filing copies of the entire federal
registration statement, whereas the Uniform Act requires only, at least
for the initial filing, copies of the federal prospectus.' 3 Colorado also
added a provision empowering the securities commissioner by order summarily to postpone or suspend effectiveness of the registration statement
"pending final determination of any proceeding under this section.""
The Uniform Act contains the identical provision, not in section 303
(the registration by coordination section), but in section 306 (provisions
applicable to all types of registration-qualification, notification or coordination) .'"
Immediately following the provisions for registration by coordination, the Colorado Securities Law provides for registration by "qualification."" As previously noted, registration by qualification prior to the
Uniform Act was a common procedure under regulatory-type blue sky
laws; and, except for the "blue-chip" securities for which registration
by notification (carrying with it automatic effectiveness) was available,
the "qualification" procedure implied that the securities sought to be
registered had to measure up to the merit standards set forth in the state
Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 243.
:1 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4 (Supp. 1957); 9C U.L.A. 100 (1957).
" Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4 (Supp. 1957).
43 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-5 (Supp. 1957) and § 303 (9C U.L.A. 104 (1957)) of
the Uniform Act.
44 Colo. Rev,. Stat. § 125-1-5(6) (Supp. 1957).
45 See
9C U.L.A. 118 (1957) and Commissioners' Note thereto. Section 306 also
explicitly refers to a "stop-order proceeding." That part of § 306 was not enacted in
Colorado, and "The Securities Law" contains no reference to a stop-order "proceeding" as such (admittedly constitutional due process may require that some kind of
"proeeding" is implied in case of issuance of a stop order). The Colorado registration
by coordination provision refers to a "proceeding . . . pending under this article"
which might in turn refer only to § 125-1-13, providing for court "proceedings" by the
attorney-general and district attorneys.
46 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-6 (Supp. 1957).
40
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law involved." Undoubtedly the same concept of "qualification" is embodied in the Uniform Act, which is basically a regulatory-type statute.
The Colorado provisions for registration by qualification have,
however, an entirely different flavor. There are no merit standards
enunciated in the Colorado statute; the commissioner need not find,
for example, whether the proposed offering and business are "fair, just
and equitable" or based on "sound business principles." Rather, section 125-1-8" 8 of the Colorado Revised Statutes states that the Colorado
securities commissioner, upon receipt of a filing under the Securities
Law, must determine "If the statements contained in such registration
statement . . . conform to the requirements of this article," i.e., whether
all information required to be set forth in the registration statement is
fully and properly presented. If so, he must, upon payment of the
proper filing fee, issue a receipt; and sales of securities presumably become legal under section 125-1-4."
The registration by qualification provisions, to a considerable ex°
tent, are simply a re-enactment of prior law. The introductory clause"
and the first fourteen items of information required to be set forth in
a registration statement by qualification"0 are substantially identical
'
The
with comparable pre-1957 provisions relating to "prospectuses.'
furnished
to
be
information
to
the
1957 amendment did, however, add
by including some of the registration by qualification provisions of
the Uniform Act requiring that there be furnished copies of any sales
literature intended to be used as of the effective date, an opinion of
counsel as to legality of the securities proposed to be offered, written
consents of experts (such as accountants and engineers) preparing or
certifying reports used in connection with the registration statement,
See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
48 Supp. 1957.
40 What is the effect, however. of the last sentence of § 125-1-6 (Supp. 1957) (the
registration by qualification provisions): "A registration statement under this section
becomes effective when the commissioner so orders." Does that sentence vest in the
commissioner, even after a determination that a registration statement contains all
information as required by the statute, discretion to deny or postpone effectiveness?
It is probably sufficient to answer that nowhere in the statute are there any standards, express or implied, by which such discretion is to be exercised; that to allow
it is to allow an "unconfined and vagrant" (see Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295
U.S. 495, 551 (1935)) administrative discretion with no limitations other than the
commissioner's personal predilections as to which securities should be offered. Such
interpretation probably implies unconstitutionality of the Securities Law (see Prouty
v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1952)) and should be rejected if any other conis reasonable. Interpretation of that sentence as only
stitutional interpretation
authorizing the commisssioner, when the disclosure requirements of the statute have
been satisfied, to order the registration statement effective is not only more reasonable (in view of absence of statutory standards relating to any further discretion)
but is more in accord with the fact that most provisions of the pre-1957 statute,
which was clearly a disclosure statute, were re-enacted by the 1957 legislation. That
interpretation apparently was adopted by the Colorado Attorney General in a recent
opinion that the securities commissioner has no discretion to refuse registration
because of past violations of the securities law, assuming the registration statement
otherwise complies with the statute. See Colo. Atty. Gen. Opinion, July 1, 1958, CCH
Blue Sky L. Rep. V 70,386.
(Supp. 1957).
5 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-6(1) (a)
5I1d. §§ 125-1-6(1)(b) through -(o). Among the information which must be submitted is the following: name and address of issuer and details as to its organization:
location of business and proposed business: names, addresses and occupations of
officers, directors, and persons performing similar functions; nature of business or
proposed business; information as to capital structure of issuer and description of
securities; details as to how capital has been paid in; amount of the proposed issue
details as to organization and promotion of issuers who
and use of proceeds tireof:
have not carried on business for more than three years, together with amounts paid
or payable to any person in connection with sale of securities; information as to
securities issued or to be issued for non-cash considerations; information as to vendors of property proposed to be purchased with proceeds of the offering: and details
as to securities issued for intangible considerations.
51 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4 (1953).
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and such additional information as the commissioner may require by
rule or order."
The 1957 legislation made many relatively insignificant changes in
the prior law which cannot be examined in detail here. However, one
other facet of the 1957 enactment should be noted. The pre-1957 law
simply empowered the securities commissioner "to administer and enforce any and all provisions of this article .. "" The authority of the
securities commissioner is now spelled out in considerably greater detail,
and, in addition to the foregoing general statement, the statute specifically authorizes the commissioner to make "public or private investigations within or outside of this state as he deems necessary to determine
whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provisions of
this article or any rule or order hereunder.
...
and authorizes him to
"publish information concerning any violation of this article or any rule
or order hereunder.""5 Further, the 1957 legislation granted to the commissioner an administrative subpoena power." The foregoing additions
to the administrative and investigative power of the commissioner again
illustrate the impact of the Uniform Act." The commissioner's power to
make "all necessary rules and regulations required to carry this article
into effect" was not, however, amplified by the 1957 amendment. 8
COVERAGE

AND EXEMPTIONS

As previously noted, the basic securities registration requirement of
the securities law is all-inclusive and applies to any offer or sale of any
security by any person unless an exemption is available." Ascertaining
whether an "offer" or "sale" or a "security" is involved and, if so, whether
an exemption is available, is therefore of considerable practicable importance upon any disposition of a security by any person.
"Offer," "Sale" and "Security"

The term "security" has a statutory definition and "means any
note, bond, debenture, collateral trust certificate, stock, treasury stock,
investment contract, transferable certificate of interest or participation
in a profit sharing agreement, certificate of interest in any oil, gas or
53 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-6(1)(p) through -(t)

(Supp. 1957) and § 304(b)(12)

through -(17) (9C U.L.A. 110) (1957)) of the Uniform Act.
6' Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-17 (1953).
55 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-19(2) (Supp. 1957). Probably no other area of commercial activity is so sensitive to adverse publicity indicative of illegality as is the securities industry. A few newspaper headlines are, if anything, even more effective in
squelching a public offering or proposed public offering than an administrative stop
order. Even if it later be shown that the publicity was entirely unjustified, the issuer
ordinarily will find that the taint of illegality survives exoneration therefrom and
that the offering will be ostracized by brokers and customers alike. In view of the
foregoing, does "authority to publish any information concerning any violation . . ."
confer on the securities commissioner a discretionary power to publish information as
to what he merely believes to be a violation? Is it sufficient for such belief to be
reasonable or based on probable cause? Or must there have been a prior administrative or judicial proceeding in which the fact of violation has been established after
hearing? Note that the same statutory section also authorizes "public investigations,"
which presumably would not involve a violation previously established. See also the
official comment and draftsmen's commentary to the Uniform Act In Loss and
Cowett, Blue Sky Law 385 (1958) and section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1952), dealing with substantially identical or similar provisions.
56 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-19(3)
(Supp. 1957).
5 The added
provisions, with some modification, are identical with §§ 407(a)
through -(c) of the Uniform Act, 9C'U.L.A. 135-136 (1957).
fs See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-11 (1953) and id. (Supp. 1957).
50Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4 (Supp. 1957).
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mining lease or title, certificate of beneficial interest in or title to prop"
erty or profits, or any other instrument commonly known as a security. "
The breadth and scope of the foregoing definition is obviously
great, with the term "investment contract" serving as a sort of catch-all.
It may be noteworthy, however, that there is no reference, at least explicitly, to pre-organization subscriptions and warrants, options or rights
to subscribe to a security. "1 Even the latter, however, may be included
within the meaning of the phrase "any other instrument commonly
known as a security.""2
The terms "offer" and "sale" are not defined as such. The securities
law does specify, however, "unlawful acts" which delineate the conduct
prohibited without registration. As a practical matter, the specifications
of unlawful acts are equivalent to definitions of "offer" and "sale" for
many purposes.
Under section 125-1-3"' of the Colorado Revised Statutes, it is an
unlawful act, without antecedent registration within the preceding
twelve months, to sell, offer, or solicit from the public the subscription
or purchase of any security, or to contract "for the future sale to the
general public of any security"; to advertise"0 or to contract for the advertising of any security to the public; to issue, publish, or circulate any
literature intended to tender securities for sale or delivery, or to solicit
or procure subscriptions for or sales of securities. In this connection, a
security is deemed to be offered for sale to the general public if it is
advertised for sale in any manner or "Where the persons solicited in
this state in any calendar year by any other means to buy shall exceed
twenty-five in number.""5
The statutory language specifying unlawful acts would appear in
some manner to cover most attempts publicly to dispose of a security
for Value. But questions arise which could be best settled by specific
statutory definitions of terms such as "offer" and "sale." For example,
in what sense, if at all, do the registration requirements of the Securities
Law apply to the following: (1) conversion privileges whereby one
60 d. § 125-1-2(2).
(Supp. 1957) exempt certain preStat. §§ 125-1-15(16) and -(17)
6'Colo. Rev.
organization certificate or subscription transactions and certain rights offerings to
stockholders.
6 For discussions of the meaning of the term "security" and its statutory definitions generally, see Loss, Securities Regulation 299-329 (1951 with 1955 Supp.);
Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 349-352 (1958).
6S Supp. 1957.
any advertising medium who knowingly permits advertisement of unregistered securities shall be prosecuted as a violator of the Securities Law. The effect is that
possible criminal liability of the publisher of a newspaper or advertising medium is
not limited to liability as an aider or abettor.
6' Section 125-1-3(d) further provides that any person publishing a newspaper or
65 If the persons solicited in any calendar year are less than twenty-five in number, does it follow that the offering is not public? Probably not, particularly if underwriters, salesmen and other trappings of a public offering are present. And, in calculating the number of persons solicited, apparently both residents and nonresidents
had to be included prior to the 1957 amendments. See Colo. Atty. Gen. Opinions,
70,072 and V] 70,081. The pre-1957
April 30 and Oct. 14, 1948, CCH Blue Sky L. Rep.
-Where the
statute provided that a security would be deemed to be publicly offered,
persons solicited by any other means to buy shall exceed fifty in number." Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 125-1-16(3) (1953). The present language is: "Where the persons solicited in
this state in any calendar year by any other means to buy shall exceed twenty-five
in number.- id. § 125-1-16(3) (Supp. 1957).
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security is convertible into another; (2) warrants or rights to subscribe
to securities; (3) gifts of warrants; (4) gifts of assessable stock; (5)
dividends involving choice of cash dividend or stock dividend; (6) exchanges or distributions of securities pursuant to merger, consolidationj
corporate sale of assets or corporate reorganization? Ambiguities are
particularly likely to be troublesome when warrants, options and conversion rights are involved." For example, if a cor)oration issues capital
stock of one class with warrants attached permitting purchase of additional shares of the same or another class, how many securities must be
registered and when? Is the result different if the warrants are not immediately exercisable or if the market price of the underlying shares is
presently substantially below the exercise price under the warrants?"
Security Exemptions
Exemptions under the Securities Law are either securities exemptions or transaction exemptions. A security is exempt if issued or guaranteed by governmental bodies," domestic non-profit corporations,"
banks or corporations which are federal instrumentalities and subject
to federal regulation," ° businesses in operation for more than the preceding five years and having specified average annual net earnings,- federal
savings and loan associations or other savings and loan associations authorized to do business in Colorado," and businesses continuously in operation in Colorado for more than twenty years if the security is secured
by a first mortgage on Colorado real estate. " There are further exemptions for any securities of issuers having outstanding securities listed on
the New York, American, Midwest and Pacific Coast stock exchanges7 ,
and, under certain conditions, for any securities secured by mortgages
on agricultural lands and urban real estate, excluding oil, gas or mining
"6 To a limited extent, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-15(17) (Supp. 1957) answers questions relating to convertible securities and wsrrants by exempting from the Securities
Law certain rights offerings to existing security holders.
07For
a general discussion of questions raised in this paragraph and how they
were handled under the Uniform Securities Act, see Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law
343-348 (1958).

Rev. Stat. §§ 125-1-15(2) and -(3)
6 Id. § 125-1-15(2).
70 Id. § 125-1-15(4).
00Colo.

7,1Id.

(Supp. 1957).

§ 125-1-15(5).

72Id. § 125-1-15(6).
78

Ibid.

74 Id. § 125-1-15(7).
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property or leases." Commercial paper maturing not more than twelve
months from date of issue is exempt if issued within three months from
such date and payable solely in cash."6 Investment contracts issued in
connection with employee benefit plans are exempt if the commissioner
is notified in writing thirty days before inception of the plan." Securities of public utilities subject to regulation or supervision as to issue
of securities by public service commissions or other similar federal or
state regulative bodies are also exempt. 6
Transaction Exemptions

Other exemptions designated as "security" exemptions are, more
accurately, transaction exemptions. The transaction exemptions include
securities sold at judicial and similar sales," by or for the account of a
pledgee or mortgagee,8" in isolated transactions by the owner, 8 transactions not involving any public offering,8" certain pre-organization
transactions, " certain rights offerings to existing security holders," and
sales to certain institutional investors. 5
Probably the most important of the transactioji exemptions is that
for a "security sold or offered for sale in an isolated transaction by the
owner thereof, or by his representative for the owner's account," which
permits ordinary day-to-day selling and buying or trading of securities.
Of most importance to issuers generally is the exemption for transactions
"not involving any public offering." In this connection, the statutory
provisions summarized above as to when a security is deemed to be
offered to the public are applicable. Unlike the comparable exemption
under the Securities Act of 1933," the exemption is not limited to transactions by issuers but also is available for transactions by other persons.
M

75 Id. § 125-1-15(8).
76 Id.
§ 125-1-15(9).
7 Id. § 125-1-15(10).
78 Id.
§ 125-1-15(15).

Id. § 125-1:-15(11).
0 Id. § 125-1-15(12).

79
8

Id.
125-1-15(13).
Id. § 125-1-15(14).
Id. § 125-1-15(16).
64 Id.
§ 125-1-15(17).
85 Id. § 125-1-15(18).
86 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1)
(1934), as amended, 68 Stat. 684,
15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(1) (Supp. 1957). Note, however, that the same section of the Securities Act of 1933 also exempts transactions by persons other than issuers, under81
82
63

writers or dealers.
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Availability of the exemption applicable to sales by pledgees hinges
on whether the sale is "in the ordinary course of business to liquidate a

the security was pledged "in good faith as
bona fide debt" and whether
7
security for such debt.

exempts sales of a "pre-organization certifiSection 125-1-15 (16)
cate or subscription" if "No commission or other remuneration is paid
or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any prospective subscriber;
the number of subscribers does not exceed ten; and no payment is made
to any subscriber." Presumably a pre-incorporation "subscription" need
not be evidenced by a writing or document and can be entirely oral. "
Section 125-1-15 (17) " exempts a "transaction pursuant to an offer
to existing security holders of the issuer, including persons who at the
time of the transactions are holders of convertible securities, non-transferable warrants, or transferable warrants exercisable within not more
than 90 days of their issuance, if: No commission or other remuneration
(other than a standby commission) " is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any security holder in this state; or the issuer first
87Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-15(12) (Supp. 1957).
"Colo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1957).
81 At least that is true under the Securities Act of 1933. See Loss, Securities Regulation 301 (1951 with 1955 Supp.).
90 Colo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1957).
91 The official comment to § 402(b)(11) of the Uniform Act states (9C U.L.A. 133
(1957)): "The reference to a 'standby' commission . . . is designed to permit payment
to an underwriter for his risk and services in connection with his commitment to
take down any portion of the offering which is not taken down by the security
holders."
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files a notice specifying the terms of the offer and the commissioner does
not by order disallow the exemption within the next five full business
days." The provision is taken from the UniforhT Act. " The administrative discretion to disallow theexemption would appear to imply that
the commissioner may- determine from the notice filed whether the exemption appears to be-available and order accordingly.
-

Burden of Proof

The person claiming any exemption under the Securities Law has
the burden of proving its availability. "' In this connection, Rule 15 of
the Rules and Regulations adopted by the Colorado Division of Securities on May 12, 1958, requires every 'issuer or dealer proposing to
make an offering believed to be exempt to submit to the Division of Securities the facts tending to establish the exemptioi! and obtain a ruling
thereon from the securities commissioner.
NON-ISSuER TRANSACTIONS

The Securities Law is ambiguou in important respects in regard to
transactions not involving the issuer. Hypothetical examples will best
present or suggest some of the basic problems. In the following discussion, bear in mind that the registration requirements are .all-inclusive
and make it unlawful for "any person". to offer or sell "any security"
unless it is registered or an exemption is available."' And, in the examples given below, assume that no exemption is relevant except that
for a transaction "not involving any public offering"" or that for a
security sold or offered "in an isolated transaction by the owner.""
Example (1). Able offers or sells to Baker, Able's 1,000 shares of X
Corporation, which has 150,000 shares outstanding, its only outstanding
security. Able does not advertise or make any public solicitation. Assuming there are no other material facts, must the shares be registered?
No. Both the private offering and isolated transaction exemptions are
available.
92 9C U.L.A.
130 (1957) (§ 402(b) (11) of Unif. Act).
13Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-15(19) (Supp. 1957).
9, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4 (Supp. 1957).
95 Id. § 125-1-15(14).
06 Id. § 125-1-15(13).
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Example (2). In example (1) , suppose, Able offers the shares by
advertising them for sale in a newspaper. .lnunediately thereafter he
sells 500 shares each to Baker and Charlie. Is the result the same?
Perhaps. Under section 125-1-16" 7 the shares are deemed to have been
offered to the general public and thle exemption for tl'ansactions ",not
involving a public offering" cannot be available. But is this within the
purview of the isolated transaction exemption? An extremely literal
reading of the statute requires a negative answer. A sale to Baker and
a sale to Charlie are separate transactions. The two transactions are
substantially contemporaneous. Consequentl.y there is no security sold
in "an isolated transaction" as required by the statute. The strict interpretation of the word "isolated" cannot be dismissed perfunictorily as
"technical" or "unrealistic." Similar exemptions tend to be narrowly
construed in other states."
But there is a further problen. Under section 125-1-7, " all registration statements must be signed by the issuer, its directors and principal
officers. Unless Able controls the issuer, it is an impossibility, as a
practical matter, for hint to cause the shares to be registered. This fact
alone reasonably would appear to require not only a more liberal inter)retation of the word "isolated" but also, in effect, a complete exemption
from the Securities Law of all Able's transactions in securities of X Corporation, regardless of the number of Able's purchasers. (Ve assume,
of course, that Able's transactions do not represent a subterfuge for
evasion of the statute, e.g., Able acts nerely as a conduit for distribution
of securities by an issuer.) This conclusion requires, however, that we
completely ignore the word "isolated" in the statutory exemption whenever the owner of securities is in no position to comapel the issuer to file
a registration statement. ' "'
Upon taking into account that isolated triansactions can and have
been strictly interpreted and that a liberal interpretation might read the
critical word completely out of the statute, the attorney advising Able
well might hesitate before giving a firm opinion that registration is not
required.
Example (3) . Assume the same facts as in example (2) except that
Able is president, a director and majority stockholder of X Corporation.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, there is much more reason in this
case to construe any possible isolated transaction exemption strictly since
Able can compel the issuer to file a registration statement. In view of
-- Colo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1957).
9S In Kneeland v. Emerton, 280 ',\ass. 371, 389. 183 N.E. 155, 163 (1932) (civil action
based on violation of blue sky law; defense:

statute exempted "any

by the owner . . . not being made in repeated and suc'cessive
character''), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated:
of securities, made one after the other within a period of such
indicate that one general purpose actuates the vendor and that

isolated sale . . .

transactions of a like
"We think two sales
reasonable time as to
the sales promote the

same aim and are not so detached and separated as to form no part of a single plan,
would be 'repeated and successive transactions.' " The -Massachusetts rule was quoted
and followed *n Gales v. -Weldon, 282 S.V.2d 522, 526 (Mo. 1955). Cf. Ersted v. Howry
Co., 68 S.D. il1, 299 N.W. 66 (1941). N.D. Laws 1951, S.B. No. IS6. § 6 specifically
limits the "isolated sale" exemption to three sales within a 12-month period. See
also CCH Blue Sky L, Rep. V12101.
99 Colo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1957).
100 This result is reached under the Federal Securities Act of 1933 by virtue of
the exemption under the first clause of § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1952), for transactions by "any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." tn this connection, note that the term "underwriter" is defined in § 2(11), id. § 77b(l1), to
include persons purchasing with a view to distribution from "any person directly or
indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or
indirect common control with the issuer."
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the wording of the isolated transaction exemption and in the light of
interpretation of similar exemptions elsewhere, Able may be legally
required to register his securities. The probability of that result in.
creases rapidly as purchasers in addition to Baker and Charlie are added
to the example. But even so, is not that result incongruous, especially in
the absence of explicit statutory language, judicial decision or administrative rules covering the situation posed? Only 1,000 shares are involved,
representing less than 1% of the outstanding securities of X Corporation.
It is one thing to say the Securities Law requires issuers to register large
blocks of securities publicly offered; it is quite another to require registration each time a relatively inconsequential public offering is made
by an individual controlling the issuer or, a fortiori, under the
facts of example (2). In the latter situations no wholesale injury to
public investors is likely to result, and it is entirely reasonable to suppose
that the statute was not intended to apply.'
The "practical" approach in both examples (2) and (3) is to contact the securities commissioner to obtain, at least informally, his prior
assent to or acquiescence in an offering without registration. But even
if that be done, possible civil liability still hovers in the background.
101 Cf. Ira Haupt & Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 3845 (1946)
(SEC administrative proceeding against broker) involving a secondary distribution of a large block of securities within a six-month period through a broker.
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Example (4). Assume that Able offers 100,000 shares of his X
Corporation stock by advertising them for sale in a newspaper and that
as a result sales are made to approximately 100 public buyers; otherwise
the facts are the same as in example (3). X Corporation in this example
well might be a closely held corporation originally organized by Able
years ago, and Able may now wish to retire from business under circumstances in which other parties in interest lack funds to buy him out. It
is fairly clear that Able must register the shares. Whatever is involved,
there clearly is a public offering and the transactions hardly could be
considered isolated. There is the further consideration, so far as public
investors are concerned, that there is involved a distribution of securities
substantially equivalent to a public offering of 100,000 shares by X
Corporation itself; and there is no apparent reason why investors should
be denied protection under the Securities Law merely because the offering is made by Able and not by X Corporation.
Example (5). Assume the same facts as in example (4) except that
Able does not advertise the shares. He contacts twenty persons in Colorado, and some or all of the persons solicited purchase the entire block.
Able need not register, not because these are isolated transactions (they
are not) , but because of the exemption for transactions "not involving
any public offering." This result depends, however, on negative implication from section 125-1-16 (d) 02 stating that a security is deemed to
be offered to the public "WVThere the persons solicited in this state in any
calendar year by any other means to buy shall exceed twenty-five in
number." The statutory language that solicitation of twenty-five persons
or more makes an offering public does not necessarily imply, however,
that an offering to less than twenty-five is not public. A careful attorney
therefore would advise Able that the exemption relied on is not absolutely clear-cut.
Example (6). The facts are the same as in example (5) except that
Able engages his securities broker to make the solicitations and pays
the broker a commission. In the opinion of the writer, registration is
required; but the opposite result would not be inconsistent with the statutory language. The employment of a securities broker and the payment of a commission are one of the prominent trappings of a public
offering; the broker's business is retailing securities and he holds himself out as offering securities to the public generally. Clearly any nega102

Colo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1957).
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tive implication from the language of section 125-1-16 (d) is considerably
weaker than in example (5). Other factors, such as whether the purchasers had sufficient knowledge of X Corporation and its securities to
have eliminated any practical necessity for them to have the benefit of
the disclosures provided by the Securities Law, well might be decisive
under these facts.1°3
RULES AND REGULATIONS

Under section 125-1-11 of the Colorado Revised Statutes,' the Commissioner of Securities is authorized "to make all necessary rules and
regulations required to carry this article into effect." Ostensibly entirely
under that authority, which is limited to the Securities Law, the Colorado
Securities Comnissioner on May 12, 1958, adopted thirty rules.'
The Rules go far beyond the scope of the Securities Law and encompass
dealers, salesmen, net capital requirements, and other matters clearly
relating only to the Fraudulent Practice Law."' ° The Rules supersede
all prior rules and regulations.
Rules Relating to Forins and Filing Requirements
Rule I prescribes that Form S-1 shall be used in registering securities by qualification, and Form S-la shall be used in registering securities
by coordination. Form S-la, as would be expected, is very simple, requiring only the filling in of basic information as to the issuer, the
securities to be offered and the dealer making the offering in Colorado.
The form need be accompanied only by a power of attorney for service
of process upon the securities commissioner and one copy of the federal
registration statement without exhibits, unless exhibits are specifically
requested by the commissioner.
Form S-1 is considerably more detailed and, in general, requires
furnishing of the information specified in section 125-1-6 of the Colo-o Under the Securities Act of 1933 it is clear that an offering to even an insubstantial number of offerees can be "public" if the offerees are not persons who,
because of adequate knowledge of the issuer and its securities, "are shown to be
able to fend for themselves." S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-125 (1953).
See also Loss, Securities Regulation 394-400 (1951), 185-187 (Supp. 1955).
104 Supp. 1957.
Rules are not generally published. Copies may be obtained from the
'o" The
Division of Securities, Department of Law, Denver, Colorado. in all probability, they
will appear in due course in CCHI Blue Sky L. Rep.
06 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 125-2-1 to -15 (Supp. 1957). The Fraudulent Practice Law
contains no general grant of rule making power but does explicitly authorize the
making of rules for certain specific purposes, e.g., prescription of financial reports
to be filed by dealers (id. § 125-2-3(8)).
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rado Revised Statutes." 7 Rule 3 requires that every Form S-I also be
accompanied by appropriate balance sheet and profit and loss information; statement of dividends paid in the preceding three years and source
thereof; analysis of surplus if type and source of surplus are not apparent
from the surplus account; copies of material contracts, leases, patents,
etc.; copies of advertisements and sales literature to be used in connection with the offering; copies of declaration of trust or articles of
incorporation as appropriate; and, if requested, copies of the resolution
authorizing issuance of securities and specimen copies of securities.
Under Rule 4, issuers organized "for the purpose of engaging primarily in the exploration, development, or exploitation of mineral deposits other than oil and gas," if filing on Form S-1, must also submit,
as to all claims acquired or to be acquired and intended to be explored,
developed or operated with public funds, a survey certificate, report of
qualified mining engineer or geologist, information as to adverse interests
in unpatented claims, title opinions, copies of locuments of title to
mining property and contracts material thereto. Under Rule 5, issuers
"organized for the purpose of acquiring royalties or interests in mineral
rights or leases with funds obtained from investors" must also file, prior
to acquisition of any such royalty or interest involving expenditure of
substantial capital contributed by public investors, a valuation report as
to the royalty or interest to be acquired. The latter requirement survives effectiveness of registration.
10- Stpp. 1957. See also note 51 supra.
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Rules Implementing Disclosure Requirements
The most important of the Rules under this heading is Rule 16,
which requires that an offering circular be used in connection with
registered offerings and that each subscription agreement contain a
statement by the purchaser that he has received and read a copy of the
offering circular.
Prior to Rule 16, the Colorado regulatory system was indeed
anomalous in adopting a basic philosophy of disclosure of material
facts without affirmatively requiring that those facts be communicated to
prospective purchasers. Purchasers could, of course, always secure copies
of the filings made with the securities commissioner and had the benefit
of the civil liability provision that a purchaser would be deemed to
have relied only on statements made in that filing.' But the prospective
purchaser who, at his own trouble and expense examines a blue sky
filing prior to making his investment decision is a rare animal indeed.
If regulation by disclosure is to be effective, the disclosure to the purchaser must take place before he parts with his money or otherwise
"gets on the hook." Rule 16 thus makes a substantial contribution to
effectuating the basic policy and purposes of the Securities Law.
The Rule specifies in considerable detail the form and content of
the offering circular to be used. In this respect, it is modeled upon and
closely follows Regulation A".. under the Securities Act of 1933 and,
to that extent, is a further significant step toward federal-state coordination. The offering circular must provide material details as to the
securities to be offered; the issuer or other person on whose behalf the
offering is made; the terms conditions and underwriting arrangements
pertaining to the offering; the purposes for which proceeds are to be
used; and the interests of promoters, insiders and underwriters in the
issuer and and the offering. In addition, there are specific requirements
for additional information as to mining issuers and oil and gas issuers.
Issuers engaged in other businesses must set forth information as to
their business, market, operating history and properties. The financial
information required to be filed under the Securities Law also must
be included in the offering circular, and all offering circulars are
subject to the general requirement that they disclose "all material facts
affecting the sale of the securities."
Rule 12 requires that issuers offering two or more classes of their
own securities in a "package offering" place a stated price on each
security. Rule 10 requires that material changes affecting the issuer and
its securities occurring after the effective date of a registration statement
be reported promptly in writing to the securities commissioner.
Rules Imposing Merit Requirements
After Colorado for thirty-five years had espoused a system of securities registration of which the official philosophy had been, at least ostensibly, purely one of requiring disclosure of all material facts relating
to public offerings, the Rules of May 12, 1958, without antecedent
fanfare by way of legislation amendatory of the Securities Law, in
1o8

See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 125-1-9 and -10

(1953).

109 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 251-62 (Supp. 1957), CCH Sec. I,. Rep. I[ 4256 and ff 7&27.
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certain important respects formally enunciated merit requirements applicable to offerings sought to be registered.
The main pertinent Rules are short and quoted in full:
"17. The commission to dealers and underwriters on
speculative issues shall not exceed 20%, including all expenses
of the issue.
"18. No commission shall be allowed any officer or director
of an issuer-dealer.
"19. Non-voting stock offered as the sole security of an issue
shall not be allowed.
"20. All installment sales contracts for the sale of securities
of a speculative venture shall provide a minimum down payment of 25% in cash, the balance payable within one year.
The underwriting commission charged shall be taken from each
initial down payment. A so-called 'front-end load' on sales
commission will not be approved, nor forfeitures upon default.
"23. No portion of an issue may be purchased by an underwriter for an issuer for anything less than full cash consider-

ation, and such shares may not be re-sold by the underwriter
during the period of the public offering.
"24. No options or warrants may be exercised by an underwriter for an issuer for a period of one year after commencement of the public offering.
"27. The so-called 'Vheel of Fortune' promotions will not
be registered, as it is determined by this rule to be in the public
interest that such promotions shall provide for the establishment
of only one subsidiary by a holding company at one time,
and during one offering.

"29. No offering will be registered wherein there is more
than 50% promotional stock."
The Colorado Securities Commissioner apparently found, in the
language of the statutory grant of rule-making power, that the Rules
quoted are among the "necessary rules and regulations required to carry

this article into effect." As previously noted, the Securities Law contains no merit requirements or standards as are commonly found in
other blue sky laws. Rather, if statutory language is any indication, the
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statutory object and purpose is entirely one of securing disclosure of
all material facts relating to offers and sales of securities subject to
the registration requirements. In what sense the foregoing Rules are
"necessary" to achieve that object and purpose or "to carry this article
into effect" requires considerable imagination. Any implication of possible statutory authority for the Rules would appear to have to rest
on the premise that the Rules involve fraudulent financing devices
which are misleading per se and as to which no amount of disclosure
will make possible an informed decision by public investors. But just how
the public investor necessarily will be misled, assuming he is fully informed of all material facts relating to for example, an offering "wherein
there is more than 50% promotional stock" is anything but obvious.
Aside from questions of lack of statutory authority, the merit Rules
present other problems. In Rule 27, for example, what is a "so-called
'Wheel of Fortune' promotion"? And, if such are not to be registered,
what is the meaning and effect of the further provision that it is determined to be in the public interest that "such promotions" shall provide for the establishment of only one subsidiary by a holding company
at one time and during one offering?
The Rules just considered might be dismissed with the observation
that either they are the result of "bull-in-the-bucket-shop."'
rule making
or else represent a forceful administrative effort, despite statutory deficiencies, to protect Colorado citizens from unscrupulous promoters.
Choice of characterization depends upon one's point of view and whose
ox is being gored. In this connection, the incumbent securities commissioner informally has stated to the author that the Rules above referred
to were adopted in order to deal immediately with flagrant violations
of law which required prompt attention and that the Rules have achieved
the result intended. But the existence in a system of securities regulation
of administrative rules whose statutory authority is open to very substantial question presents a serious aspect often not present in other
areas of governmental regulation. The issuer proposing to make a public
offering is, as a practical matter, in no position to question in the courts
a state administrator's authority to issue a doubtful regulation." ' "The
managers of the company are interested in obtaining capital, not in
litigating nice legal questions. .. . Hence the managers will exercise their
110 See Editorial, The Denver Post, June 23, 1958, p. 14, col. 1 and 2.
S11 Thirty-five years of the Securities Law have resulted in no significant reported
decisions thereunder.
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inalienable privilege to damn the administrator-in the privacy of their
offices, of course-and either change their offering to satisfy2 the administrator's objections or forget about financing in his state."".
CONCLUSION

The Colorado Securities Law is a small segment of a nationwide
collocation of federal and state systems of securities registration diverse
in matters of detail as well as underlying policies. The Colorado legislators early adopted as a basic policy for this state the disclosure, as
distinguished from the regulatory, approach to securities registration.
To a significant extent, the Colorado legislation has been coordinated
with the Federal Securities Act of 1933. Despite several amendments
however, the Securities Law leaves unanswered many questions of considerable practicable importance, e.g., how do the registration requirements apply to secondary distributions and problems associated with
convertible securities, warrants, and options. The present administrative
regulations under the statute in important respects, such as in requiring
use of offering circulars, contribute substantially to effectuating the
basic policies of the act. To the extent such regulations prescribe merit
requirements for registered offerings, however, they go far beyond any
statutory authority, express or implied.
112 Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Lav 64 (1958).
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NOTES
REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE COMMISSIONS
INCOLORADO
By E. R.

ARCHAMBEAU,

JR.

E. R. Archambeau, Jr. received his B.S. degree from Texas Technological
College in 1949 and his M. S. from the University of Illinois in 1950. He is a
student at the University of Denver College of Law.
Suits involving real estate brokerage commissions comprise a significant portion of present-day litigation. In such cases the usual question
is whether the real estate broker is entitled to his commission where
a sale has not been effected or where some outside influence has altered
the original conditions.
The usual real estate listing contract must be considered as unilateral in nature. The owner, anxious to sell or trade his property,
places it in the hands of a broker and promises to pay a commission
should the broker succeed. It is rare that the broker makes a return
promise that he will find a buyer. Such a transaction, therefore, is an
offer by the owner for the formation of a unilateral contract. The
broker is granted the privilege of accepting by performing the requested
service. It is evident that a contract is not completed until that service
has been performed, either substantially or completely. The conclusion
that the listing contract is unilateral in nature is further substantiated
by the fact that the owner has no action for breach of contract if the
broker fails or refuses to perform.
It is true, of course, that other factors can be introduced to vary
this simple illustration and thereby create more complex situations. For
example, at what stage of the broker's performance in seeking a purchaser (toes a valid contract come into being, entitling the broker to his
commission? The purpose of this note is to outline the Colorado law
pertaining to the subject of real estate brokerage commissions.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND

CONDITIONS

The general rules pertaining to real estate brokerage commissions
are well defined in Colorado. Both the cases and the statutes have established the boundaries that determine whether a broker has earned his
commission. The pertinent statute states:
"No real estate agent or broker shall be entitled to a commission for finding a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to
complete the purchase of real estate as proposed by the owner,
until the same is consummated or is defeated by the refusal or
neglect of the owner to consummate the same as agreed upon."'
This rule has been repeated and amplified many times throughout
' Colo. Rev. Stat. § 117-2-1 (1953).
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the judicial history of the state. Before a broker is entitled to his
commission, it is necessary that he produce a prospect who is ready,
willing and able to purchase the property upon the terms designated
by the owner. The broker must also be the "procuring or moving cause"
of the sale, and the sale must proceed from his efforts as a broker.'
If, through some fault of the principal, the sale is not consummated,
the broker may recover his commission if he has produced such a purchaser.' It is a prerequisite, however, that the broker perform his part
of the bargain.'
The broker, of course, first must be employed by the principal
before he may become entitled to a commission for procuring an eligible
buyer. A mere statement by the owner of the price at which he values
his property cannot be considered as an offer to sell through the broker.
Further negotiations between the broker and the owner may possibly
create a valid contract, but there must be something more than the
mere statement of value.' Even if the broker, in response to such a
statement of value, finds a purchaser, no liability is imposed upon the
owner unless the owner accepts the broker's offer. Acceptance by the
owner of the brokers offer creates a valid controct.' However, it has
been held that such an acceptance by the owner does not necessarily
entitle the broker to a commission if the owner had originally named
a net price; for then, the owner may assume that the broker is looking
elsewhere for his commission.'
THE MOVING CAUSE RULE

How much effort by the broker is required before he may be considered the "moving or procuring cause" of the sale? This problem is
presented perhaps more often than any other single question in suits
for real estate commissions. A simple rule is found in a California case
where the court said, "He who shakes the tree is the one to gather
the fruit."' No Colorado statute mentions "moving cause," and therefore it is necessary to refer to case law for clarification of this point. It
is elementary that the broker's efforts must be the principal source of
motivation for the purchaser. The broker's efforts must be so extensive
Cole v. Thornburg, 4 Colo. App. 95, 34 Pac. 1013 (1893); Restatement, Agency
§ 448 (1933).
SFinnerty v. Fritz, 5 Colo. 174 (1879).
4 Crampton v. Irwin, 71 Colo. 1, 203 Pac. 672 (1922).
5 Castner v. Richardson, 18 Colo. 496, 33 Pac. 163 (1893).
6 Geier v. Howells, 47 Colo. 345, 107 Pac. 255 (1910).
7 Clammer v.
Eddy, 41 Colo. 235, 92 Pac. 722 (1907).
s Sessions v. Pacific Improvement Co., 57 Cal. App. 1. 206 Pac. 653, 660 (1922).
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that the sale would not have been made without his work. It is not sufficient if the broker merely conveys an acceptance of an offer to the
principal where the offeror himself had been previously negotiating
with the owner.' When tile prospective buyer engages a broker to show
him a specific property that already has been described to him by
another broker, such exhibition does not represent sufficient moving
cause. It has been held in such a case that the plaintiff was not even
the procuring cause of the buyer's seeing the property.'
After showing the property to a client, the broker must follow
through in order to earn his commission. Should he fail to follow through
or to inform his principal of the prospective buyer, he will not be heard
to complain when the principal negotiates and concludes the sale without his assistance."i
Typical of many similar cases is Cowgill v. Neet"' which involved
an agreement between two brokers providing that commissions would
be shared on sales made by either to prospective buyers sent by the
other. The plaintiff had shown his client some property which he knew
was listed with the defendant. The client was unable at first to reach
an agreement with the owner, but was successful later, following negotiations'at the defendant's office. The court held that the plaintiff
was the moving cause of the sale since he had produced the buyer in
contemplation of the contract, and therefore he was entitled to a share
of the commission.
In cases involving multiple-listing property, the principal must be
equally fair to all-brokers. The broker is entitled to a commission if his
efforts are defeated by granting of reduced terms by the principal to
a second broker who sells the property to a client known to have beer.
procured by the first broker." However, should another broker close
a sale on equal or-more favorable terms, the first broker earns nothing
since he was unable to close the sale.REQUIREMAIENTS Of

A SALE

A sale must be made before the broker has earned his commission
unless the principal has interfered in some way to the detriment of the
Heady v. Tomlinson, 134 Colo. 33, 299 P.2d 120 (1956).
0 Williams v. Smith, 26 Colo. App. 23, 139 Pac. 1124 (1914). Accord, Root v. Barbour, 51 Colo. 399, 118 Pac. 968 (1911)
(third party told the prospect property was
for sale).
11 Conway-Bogue Realty and Inv. Co. v. Blurch, 93 Colo. 518, 27 P.2d 500 (1933);
Chaffee v. Widman, 48 Colo. 34, 41, 108 Pac. 995, 997-98 (1910).
12 127 Colo. 184, 255 P.2d 399 (1953). And see Bigler v. Croy, 81 Colo. 505, 256 Pac.
18 (1927); Niebergall v. James, 78 Colo. 190, 240 Pac. 332 (1925) (broker was not the
moving cause and did not receive commission); Satisfaction Title and Inv. Co. v.
York, 54 Colo. 566, 131 Pac. 444 (1913) (broker was moving catuse of sale because he
had asked a neighbor to tell the visiting buyer-to-be about the property); Leonard v.
Roberts, 20 Colo. 88, 36 Pac. 880 (1894)
(buyer, mistaken in thinking that plaintiff
worked for defendant, bought property from defendant after a friend had said that
the plaintiff was handling the property); Leech v. Clemons, 14 Colo. App. 45, 59 Pac.
230 (1899) (sale made through instrumentality of an agent of the broker).
11 Ness v. Todd. 86 Colo. 403, 282 Pac. 250 (1929); Walker v. Bennett and Meyers
Inv. Co., 79 Colo. 170, 244 Pac. 465 (1926); Millage v. Irwin, 68 Colo. 188, 187 Pac. 525
(1920); Idelson v. Robinson, 27 Colo. App. 507, 150 Pac. 322 (1915).
14 Ginsberg v. Frankenberg, 133 Colo. 382, 295 P.2d 1036 (1956):
Hodgin v. Palmer,
72 Colo. 331, 211 Pac. 373 (1922); vitherbee v. Walker, 42 Colo. 1, 93 Pac. 1118 (1908);
Carper v. Sweet, 26 Colo. 547. 59 Pac. 45 (1899).
0
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broker. Moreover, there must be a completed sale and not just an
option to buy. Procuring a prospect who negotiates an option contract
with the owner does not entitle the broker to his commission when the
prospective buyer fails to purchase the property. 5
One early case"6 presented a unique situation where the broker was
held not entitled to his commission even though he had produced
two prospective purchasers. The first prospect signed an option for
the purchase of the property. While this option was still in effect, the
broker produced another prospective buyer, but the owner refused to
consider the second proposition. The first prospective buyer subsequently
permitted the option to lapse, but by that time the second prospect
was no longer interested. The court held that the owner was justified
in refusing to discuss the second offer while the option was still in effect.
Therefore, since both the optionee and the second client failed to complete any transaction, there was no basis for awarding the broker a commission.
In another early case the broker was promised his commission at tie
time of the first payment of the purchase price if he could find a buyer
for his principal's mining property. The plaintiff secured a prospective
buyer who negotiated a contract with the owner whereby the vendee
agreed to pay approximately 40% of the purchase price for the right
of possession. The balance was to be paid systematically from profits
realized from operation of the mine. The contract further provided
that should the vendee find operation unprofitable, the contract could
be declared void, with the vendee forfeiting all that he had paid to date
as liquidated damages. Soon after assuming possession, the prospective
buyer forfeited all monies paid and the contract was declared void.
The court held that the broker's commission had been contingent upon
a completed sale. Therefore, he was not entitled to a commission by
procuring a prospect who merely entered into an option agreement or a
contract providing that payment in full was optional with the vendee."
Occasionally some extrinsic circumstance will result in the failure of
a prospective sale. In Clyncke v. Brant,'" after the sale had been completed and the broker paid his commission, the vendor and vendee on
their own initiative decided to exchange the property and rescind the
sale. In a suit for a refund of the commission the plaintiff-principal's
claim was denied. The court held that in the absence of fraud or an
agreement providing for a refund of the commission, the broker was
entitled to a commission for his services since a sale had been made.
A similar result was reached in Wray v. Carpenter" where tile vendee
later proved to be financially unable to complete payment, and it was
necessary for the vendor and the vendee to resell the property to another.
The court ruled that the vendor must be held to have considered and
approved the financial ability of the buyer when he accepted the buyer's
proposition.
In one interesting case the court held that where the government
subsequently takes the offered land through eminent domain proceed's Neal v. North Fork Land & Cattle Co., 73 Colo. 79, 213 Pac. 334
v. Haigler, 63 Colo. 200, 165 Pac. 265 (1917).
1" Fox v. Denargo Land Co., 37 Colo. 203, 86 Pac. 344 (1906).
'7 Brown v.
Keegan, 32 Colo. 463, 469, 76 Pac. 1056, 1058 (1904).
"8 117 Colo. 245, 185 P.2d 783 (1947).
"1 16 Colo. 271, 27 Pac. 248 (1891).
See also note 28 infra.

(1923);

Stelson
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ings, the broker is not entitled to his commission even though he has
been engaged to negotiate a sale to the government." In a similar
case the broker was found to be ineligible for a commission where he
had secured options upon the owner's land for a corporation engaged
in wartime contracts with the government. " In each of these cases the
court held that condemnation does not constitute a sale, and therefore
does not operate as such under the broker's contract.
The broker must be free of carelessness in handling and negotiating
a contract for the principal in order to be entitled to his commission.
In Boggs v. Lumbar'" the broker knew that conveyance of the property
was contingent upon the county court's approval of any sale he might
negotiate. After the broker found a prospect the county court refused
to approve the sale. The Colorado Supreme Court refused the agent's
subsequent plea for his commission since he had known of the restriction
and had failed to complete a sale as agreed. In another case, where
the listing contract stated that time was of the essence, the plaintiff was
also refused his commission. This decision was reached when it was
shown that the transaction was not completed within the required time
because of the broker's
neglect and tardiness, and that for this reason
2
the sale was not made.

3

Gray v. Blake"' involved a situation where the broker failed to
obtain a listing from both joint tenants, husband and wife, and the
wife later refused to convey the property to a prospective vendee even
though her husband was willing to do so. The court held that the broker
had the right to rely upon the asumption of authority by the husband
in proposing the listing, and that the husband could not avoid liability
solely on the ground that he was later unable to induce his wife to join
in the conveyance. However, since the broker had known at the time of
the listing that the wife was a joint tenant and did not wish to sell,
he was not entitled to a commission since he had failed to obtain a listing
from her.
As mentioned before, the vendor-principal has an obligation to the
broker not to unduly hinder the transaction. Where there is a title
20 Haigler v. Ingle, 119 Colo. 145, 200 P.2d 913 (1948) (plaintiff had no part in
initiating the condemnation proceedings).
21 Wilson v.
Ross Inv. Co., 116 Colo. 249, 180 P.2d 226 (1947) (broker knew nothing
of the beginning of condemnation proceedings, and his subsequent offer to assist
owner in these proceedings was refused).
22 75 Colo. 212, 225 Pac. 266 (1924).
22 Dunton v.
Stemme, 117 Colo. 327, 187 P.2d 593 (1947).
-" 128 Colo. 381, 262 P.2d 741 (1953).
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defect or an encumbrance, it is mandatory that the owner be prepared
to convey clear title to a prospective purchaser after a binding contract
has been signed. " It is also necessary that the principal be prepared
and able to convey the property as listed. In one case, where the
prospective vendor failed to place a bid at a foreclosure sale held to
pay off a mortgage, the court held that the broker had earned his
commission by obtaining a prospective buyer even though the principal

no longer owned the property. "
The broker is entitled to his commission when he produces a prospective buyer who is ready, willing and able to purchase upon the seller's
terms. Although the owner-principal is not required to convey the
property to the prospective buyer, he is liable for a commission to the
broker. The owner is precluded from rejecting any valid offer in accordance with the original terms so as to avoid liability for a commission. It matters not what reason is given for refusing the offer."7
The broker has been granted a commission where the principal
rescinded the sales contract after learning that the prospect had misrepresented facts to both the broker and the owner. 8 The same result has
been reached in another case where the seller refused to convey any of
the listed property when the buyer refused to pay for part of the described land which the seller did not own.2 In such situations, however,
the broker must be able to show that he procured an eligible buyer
upon the seller's original terms. The burden of proof is upon the broker
to show not only that the prospective purchaser was ready, willing and
able, but that the sale would have been made."0
An interesting case, involving two separate counts, illustrates the
two extremes usually found when the owner refuses to deal with a buyer.
25Morgan v. Howard Realty Co., 68 Colo. 414, 191 Pac. 114 (1920); Xv. T. Craft
Realty Co. v. Livernash, 27 Colo. App. 1, 146 Pac. 121 (1915). Cf. Colo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 117-2-2 and 117-2-3 (1953).
2 Amidon v. Bettex. 102 Colo. 162. 77 P.2d 1032 (1938).
27 McCullough v. Thompson, 133 Colo. 352, 295 P.2d 221 (1956); Klipfel v. Bowes,
(owner's attorney removed the owner's signature
108 Colo. 583, 120 P.2d 959 (1942)
from contract when broker refused to split his commission with the attorney); Dickey
v. Waggoner, 108 Colo. 197, 114 P.2d 1097 (1941). Cf., Cornett v. Cunningham, 75 Colo.
220, 225 Pac. 249 (1924) (where. however, defendant had promised to pay a commisValsh, 71 Colo. 185, 205 Pac. 276 (1922)
sion "only if a deal is made"); Norris v.
(commission was to be paid "when the purchase price is paid").
28 Deweese v. Brown, 55 Colo. 430, 135 Pac. 800 (1913) (property traded by prospect
was later found to be subject to flooding despite the assurances of prospect; court
held that defendant had accepted prospect as a valid purchaser upon entering into
contract, and was therefore liable for payment of a commission).
29 Cawker v. Apple. 15 Colo. 141, 25 Pac. 181 (1890).
30 Colburn v. Seymour, 32 Colo. 430, 76 Pac. 1058 (1904).
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The plaintiff was engaged to find buyers for several large tracts belonging to the defendant. The listing contract stipulated that the vendee
must make a down payment of 25-30% of the purchase price with the
balance to be paid on terms to be negotiated by the buyer and owner.
Count one of the complaint alleged that plaintiff had found a prospective buyer for one of the defendant's tracts, but that the owner refused
to negotiate terms for payment of the balance. Here the court declared
that the broker was entitled to his commission since the owner had
not made an honest effort to reach an agreement. While the owner was

not required to consummate an agreement upon terms, he was bound
to make a reasonable attempt to reach such an agreement. But, said
the court, if such negotiations are commenced in good faith, the broker
is not entitled to his commission until the terms were agreed upon.
Count two alleged similar facts. Here, however, the prospective buyer
had made an offer of only 121/2% down, which the defendant refused.
The court sustained the defendant's right of refusal and held that
the plaintiff had not produced a buyer ready, willing and able to buy
in accordance with the terms of the listing."

It is also fundamental that once the principal names a selling
price, he is precluded from later increasing it. Here too, the principal
is not bound to accept the offer made by a prospective buyer, but he is
liable for a commission to the broker whether he sells or not. It is immaterial that the value has increased, or that the owner feels his original
asking price is too low.3 " This general rule was modified in Cocquyt v.
Shower" by making an exception where the lapse of time between the
making of the listing and the procurement of a prospect was unreasonable, and the owner had materially increased the value of the sale
property by improvements and additions.
Where only an option agreement is entered, it has been held that
the broker is not entitled to his commission if the prospective buyer
either refuses or fails to complete the transaction. This is true even if
the would-be purchaser has paid part of the purchase price.'
" Costilla, Land Co.
v. Robinson, 238 F.2d 105 (10th Cir. 1956); Dickey v. Waggoner, 108 Colo. 197. 114 P.2d 1097 (1941).
.2 Dickey v. WVaggoner, supra note 31; Perkins v. Russell, 56 Colo. 120. 137 Pac. 907
(1913) (subject of sale was herd of sheep): Millett v. Barth, 18 Colo. 112, .1 Pac. 769
(1892); Buckingham v. Harris, 10 Colo. 455. 15 Pac, 817 (1887); Smith v. Fairchild.
7 Colo. 510, 4 Pac. 757 (1884).
" 68 Colo. 89, 189 Pac. 606 (1920).
VWalker v. Chatfield, 126 Colo. 600, 252 P.2d 109 (1952): Norris v. Valsh, 71 Colo.
185. 205 Pac. 276 (1922); Hildenbrand v. Lillis. 10 Colo. App. 522, 51 Pac. 1008 (1898).
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As a general rule, the broker is entitled to his commission when
a sale is made on substantially the same terms as given in the listing.
Any material change in terms, however, must be agreed to by the owner."'
The same rule is applied with even greater emphasis when the broker
is engaged to find someone with whom the principal may trade his
property. The court has often pointed out that where a trade is contemplated, the principal must expect some variation in terms in order
to equalize differentials in values between the properties. "
SALES MADE By PERSONS OTHER THAN THE BROKER
The general rules concerning moving cause, employment of the
broker, modification of terms and refusal by the owner to convey apply
equally where someone other than the original broker sells the property.
As will be shown later, the rule in Colorado apparently is that the owner
may sell his own property unless expressly prohibited by the listing
contract." The courts are careful to inquire into any sale made by the
owner where there may be a possibility of fraud and will not permit the
owner to escape liability for a commission if he has not acted in good
faith."'
The principal may discharge the broker at any time and sell the
property himself if he does not take advantage of the broker's prior
work in doing so." However, in the absence of fraud, the owner is
privileged to sell the property himself without waiting indefinitely for
the prospect with whom the broker is unable to close.4"
The courts will also apply the rule of moving cause and permit a
broker to recover his commission whenever the broker has been instrumental in bringing the parties together. 1 Thus the broker will recover
when the owner closes the sale himself upon slightly different terms"2
or when the broker is not personally present. at the closing of the sale
after he has brought the parties together. "
Closely allied to the subject of moving cause are those cases where
the owner himself sells the property to one not procured by the broker.
As always, the courts will scrutinize the transaction to insure that the
sale was made in good faith. Consequently, the courts will not permit
a sham sale to avoid payment of the broker's commission." However, if
the
the sale is made in good faith, it becomes a question of whether
broker had produced a buyer before the owner sold to another.4"
' Flower v. Humphreys, 72 Colo. 25, 209 Pac. 503 (1922); Minks v. Clark, 70 Colo.
323, 201 Pac. 45 (1921); Burgess v. Cole, 69 Colo. 341, 194 Pac. 611 (1920); Geiger V.
Kiser, 47 Colo. 297, 304-05, 107 Pac. 267, 270 (1910).
36 Houston v. H. G. Wolff and Son Inv. Co., 94 Colo. 73, 28 P.2d 255 (1933); Knowles
v. Harvey, 10 Colo. App. 9, 52 Pac. 46 (1897); Carson v. Baker, 2 Colo. App. 248, 29
Pac. 1134 (1892).
.7 Lambert v. Haskins, 128 Colo. 433, 263 P.2d 433
(1953).
3' Thompson v.
Wolff, 108 Colo. 259, 115 P.2d 649 (1941); Troutman v. Webster.
82 Colo. 93, 257 Pac. 262 (1927); McCampbell v. Cavis, 10 Colo. App. 242, 50 Pac. 728
(1897).
8 Liggett v. Allen, 77 Colo. 116, 234 Pac. 1072 (1925).
40 Babcock v. Merritt, 1 Colo. App. 84, 27 Pac. 882 (1891) (sale made some six
(plaintiff
months later). Accord, Wheeler v. Beers, 45 Colo. 547, 101 Pac. 758 (1909)
did not continue his efforts and the sale was subsequently made some eighteen months
later through no effort of the plaintiff). Cf., Geiger v. Kiser, 47 Colo. 297, 304-05, 107
Pac. 267, 270 (1910) (sale made shortly after owner had initially rejected the buyer's
offer; owner held liable for commission).
Boyer, 68 Colo. 568, 193 Pac. 492 (1920).
41 Jones v.
42 Houston v. I. G. Wolff and Son Inv. Co., 94 Colo. 73, 28 P.2d 255 (1933).
- Zeigler v. Butler, 64 Colo 274, 171 Pac. 64 (1918); Howe v. Werncr, 7 Colo. App.
530, 44 Pac. 511 (1896).
44 Fist v.
Currie, 49 Colo. 284, 112 Pac. 689 (1910); Innes v. Bogan, Gaines & Co.,
41 Colo. 9, 91 Pac. 1108 (1907).
45 Dickey v.
Waggoner, 108 Colo. 197, 114 P.,2d 1097 (1941); Fist v. Corrie, supra
note 44; Owl Canon Gypsum Co. v. Ferguson, 2 Colo. App. 219, 30 Pac. 255 (1892)
(subject of stocks in the defendant company; good dissenting opinion).

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1958

DICTA

The case of Anderson v. Smythe"0 dealt with the problem of the
owner directly selling the property. In that case the broker did not tell
the prospect who the owner was, nor did he tell the owner of the offer.
After refusing the broker's offer, the prospect bought the same property
on his own initiative. Here the court felt that the broker had not brought
the parties together and released the owner from liability for commissions.
In Lawrence v. Weir" the defendant employed the plaintiff to find
purchasers for both his old home and a new house which he had recently
built. Plaintiff made no mention of the older house to a client, but
attempted unsuccessfully to interest him in the newer house. Later, the
client on his own initiative learned of the older house and purchased it.
The court ruled the owner not liable to the broker for any commission.
The broker had made no effort to interest his client in the older house
and was not the moving cause of the sale.
EXCLUSIVE LISTING CONTRACTS

Exclusive listing contracts present perhaps the most difficult situations for adjudication. It is clear that whether the broker is given the
exclusive agency or the exclusive right to sell the principal's property,
the principal is precluded from selling through another broker." However, should the first broker fail to find a buyer within the appointed
time, there is nothing to prevent a second broker from selling the property after the first listing is cancelled."9
Very often, after engaging a broker in an exclusive listing, the owner
will negotiate and conclude a sale himself. Nothing in the pertinent
statutes prohibits this, and therefore the question is whether the broker
had the exclusive right or only the exclusive agency to sell. Naturally
all of the factors previously discussed, such as moving cause, must also
be considered. Only one case on this specific point has been decided in
Colorado. In Lambert v. Haskins5" the plaintiff agent had been unable
to close a sale when the owner himself sold the property at a lower price.
Although the listing contract provided that the broker was the exclusive
agent, and thereby precluded the owner's selling through another broker,
the court held that the owner could sell the property himself without
liability, unless expressly prohibited from doing so by the contract.
Examination of several currently-used exclusive listing contracts
reveals that they purport to grant the broker exclusive rights of sale.
All of these contracts expressly provide that a sale by the owner to any
party with whom the broker has negotiated will not defeat the broker's
right to a commission." Some contract forms include the additional
phrase "and whose name was disclosed to the owner by the broker."
It would be of great interest to see how the Colorado Supreme Court
would rule in a case involving such a "name disclosure clause" where
the owner himself sold the property to a party whose name had not
been divulged by the broker. It seems probable that the Supreme Court
1 Colo. App. 253. 28 Pac. 478 (1891).
3 Colo. App. 401, 33 Pac. 646 (1893).
Paulsen v. Rourke, 26 Colo. App. 488. 145 Pac. 711 (1914).
41 Wallick v. Eaton, 110 Colo. 358, 134 P.2d 727 (1943).
50 128 Colo. 433, 263 P.2d 433 (1953) (case of first impression in Colorado).
51 The usual period is 60-days following the end of the agreed period for exlusive
listing. This is. of course, in addition to the listing period itself.
46
47

48
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would sustain the right of the owner to sell his own property to any
person not contacted by the broker. It is possible that the same right
to sell would be extended in such a case whether or not the name disclosure clause lie included in the listing contract. It seems reasonable
to conclude that the Lambert case means that the exclusive agency (or
right) applies only to parties contacted by the broker and whose names
are disclosed to the owner. Any other interpretation would place an
unreasonable limitation on the right of the owner to sell his own
property.
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CASE COMMENTS
Negligence - Res Ipsa Loquitur - Procedural Effect
]y

ANNE DoUTHIrr

Anne Douthit received her B.S. degree in Business Administration from the
University of Denver and is a Certified Public Accountant. Presently she is a
student at the College of Law, and Note and Case Comment Editor of
DICTA.
Plaintiff brought an action for damages for personal injury caused
by the loss of her hair after she received a permanent wave administered
by an employee of the defendant beauty salon operator. The complaint
included a general allegation of negligence, and in addition the plaintiff
averred that the defendant, upon examination of her scalp, had stated
that the condition was caused by the negligence of the beauty operator.
After a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed, asserting
among other things, that there should not have been an instruction to
the jury on the law governing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, nor
should the plaintiff have been allowed to rely upon tile doctrine after
pleading specific acts of negligence. The supreme court's decision in
this case reviews and attempts to clarify Colorado's somewhat confusing
law on the procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
court, in affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, concluded that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor creates a presumption of law, and thereby
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, who must overcome the
presumption with a preponderan'ce of evidence. It was also held that
specific allegations of negligence, in addition to the general allegation,
do not render the doctrine inapplicable. Weiss v. Axler, 328 P.2d 88
(Colo. 1958).
A review of some Colorado cases involving the application of the
res ipsa loquiur doctrine indicates that the results have been grossly inconsistent. The majority of these cases have taken the position that the
application of this doctrine shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.'
Under this theory, a presumption of negligence arises, and the defendant
must overcome the presumption with a preponderance of evidence. A
second group of Colorado cases rejected the burden-shifting theory and
found that application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine merely shifts the
burden of going forward with the evidence.- Under this theory the
burden of proof continues to be on the plaintiff. In order for the plaintiff
to satisfy his burden of proof, and make out a primna facie case, it must
be shown that the defendant had control over the instrumentality causing the injury.' Plaintiffs did not show that this necessary element existed,
therefore it would seem that the presmption of negligence, as defined
in the earlier cases, did not arise in this group of cases.
See, e.g., Gylling v. Hinds, 122 Colo. 345, 222 P.2d 413 (1950); Sanderson v.
Frazier, 8 Colo. 79, 5 Pac. 632 (1884); Wall v. Livezay. 6 Colo. 465 (1882); Denver
S.P. & P. Ry. Co. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 1 (1877); Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nutter,
2 Colo. 442 (1874).
2 Brighton v. De Gregorio, 136 Colo. 1, 314 P.2d 276 (1957); Denver Dry Goods Co. v
Pender, 128 Colo. 281, 262 P.2d 257 (1953); Boulder Valley Coal Co. v. Jernberg, 118
Colo. 486, 197 P.2d 155 (1948).
3 See, e.g., Yellow Cab Co. v. Iodgson. 91 Colo. 365, 14 P.2d 1081 (1932); Velotta v.
Yampa Valley Coal Co., 63 Colo. 4S9. 167 Pac. 971 (1917).
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A third result which has been reached in Colorado's courts, is that
the presumption is evidence to be weighed as such against that of the
defendant to determine whether or not the defendant was negligent.'
The court stated "The doctrine does not dispense with the necessity that
the plaintiff prove the fact of negligence, but is itself a mode of proving
'
negligence, and is therefore evidence." In direct conflict with this
statement, is a more recent case which states, ". . . (T) he doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur merely takes the place of evidence as affecting the
burden of proceeding with the case, and is not itself evidence."'
Another area of conflict in the Colorado courts has been the question
of the effect of the plaintiff's introducing evidence of specific negligence
or his allegation of specific negligence in the pleadings. Also difficult
to reconcile are the decisions stating the effect of the defendant's rebutting evidence. It has been held that the disclosure of the cause of the
accident by the defendant puts the two parties on equal footing as to
knowledge and means of information, and the doctrine can no longer
be applied.' Exactly opposite results were indicated, however, in a contemporaneous opinion which held that disclosure of the cause of the
accident would not necessarily prevent application of the doctrine!
Other decisions have shifted the burden of proof back to the plaintiff,
without requiring the defendant to prove affirmatively that his negligent
acts were not the cause of the injury.' The better reasoned rule seems to
be that where the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, it must be
for the jury to decide whether the defendant's evidence overcomes the
presumption." The doctrine has been made available to the plaintiff
where the defendant's specific acts of negligence were shown by the evidence." But, in another holding, res -ipsa loquitur was ruled inapplicable when specific proof of the. cause of injury was shown."
Dean Prosser has made an exhaustive study of the various applications of the doctrine in the United States." He found that the majority of
American courts treat the doctrine as raising nothing more than a permissible inference." Such an application permits the jury to infer the
defendant's negligence from the plaintiff's case without other evidence.
The plaintiff's burden of proof is sufficiently satisfied to avoid a nonsuit or dismissal of the case, but, a directed verdict for the plaintiff is
not thereby justified. This is the position followed by the federal courts.
1
The leading case, Sweeney v. Irving," provided a clear statement of the
theory. It was there specifically stated that the doctrine does not have
Colorado Springs and Interurban Ry. Co. v. Reese, 69 Colo. 1, 169 Pac. 572 (1917).
Id. at 7, 169 Pac. at 575 (emphasis supplied).
Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Pender, 128 Colo. 281, 262 P.2d 257 (1953) (emphasis
supplied).
7 St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
8 Scott v. Greeley Joslin Store Co. Inc., 125 Colo. 367, 243 P.2d 394 (1952).
Nutt v. Davison, 54 Colo. 586, 131 Pac. 390 (1913).
10 See note 4 supra and Rudolph v. Elder, 105 Colo. 105, 95 P.2d 827 (1929); Denver
Tramway Corp. v. Kuttner, 95 Colo. 312, 35 P.2d 852 (1934).
11 See note 8 supra.
4

12

See note 7 supra.

1' Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (1936).
14 See also, Carpenter,
The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 10 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 166, 171 (1937).

15 228 U.S. 233 (1912) which states, "In

our opinion 'res ipsa !oquitur' means that

the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel
such an inference, that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where
direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily
to be accepted as sufficient; that they ca.ll for explanation or rebuttal, not necessaxily that they require it; that they make a case to be decided by the jury, not that

they forestall the verdict."
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the effect of shifting the burden of proof'." Many jurisdictions go a step
farther, according to Dean Prosser, and treat a res ipsa loquitur case
as creating a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant.
In this situation, the jury is required to find the defendant negligent
in absence of evidence to the contrary. The burden of going forward
with the evidence is on the defendant, and if all the evidence is evenly
balanced, the verdict must be for the defendant. Only a few jurisdictions give the doctrine the greater effect of shifting the burden of proof
to the defendant in which case the defendant must prove by preponderance of evidence that the injury was not caused by his negligence.
The other questions raised by the instant case-the effects of the
introduction of specific evidence, of the allegation of specific negligence,
and of the rebutting evidence-seem to be as confusing in other jurisdictions as they are in Colorado. Dean Prosser, in his article dealing with
these questions found that the courts have taken at least four positions
in cases where the plaintiff has alleged specific negligence." In his
opinion, the preferable rule would be that the allegation of specific
negligence, accompanied by a general allegation of negligence, should
not defeat the plaintiff's reliance on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, if the
specific allegations should fail.'" Dean Prosser also found that it is
generally agreed that it is for the jury to determine whether or not the
evidence offered by the defendant defeats the inference or presumption
raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case. However, it should be noted
that Dean Prosser was discussing cases where the burden of proof had
not been shifted to the defendant. It is his opinion that shifting the
burden of proof by the inference raised in a res ipsa loquitur case gives
circumstantial evidence more weight than would be given to direct
evidence."
In all the Colorado cases reviewed by this writer which follow the
shift-of-burden theory, it was stated that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
raises a presumption of negligence. -' Prior to the instant case there has
been no effort to define or clarify whether or not the presumption was
one of fact or one of law. In 1937 American Insurance Co. v. Naylor"
clarified the effect of a presumption of fact in Colorado. There, it was
stated that such a presumption makes a prima facie case upon which, in
the absence of contrary evidence, judgment must be rendered for the
plaintiff. The burden of proof is not thereby shifted to defendant, but
onlv the burden of going forward with the evidence. This holding seems
to indicate that except where there is a conclusive presumption, or a
presuml)tion of law, the burden of proof can never be shifted.
In the instant case, it is argued that "since the court decides as a
matter of law the existence of probable negligence making a prima facie
case, the presumption is truly one of law.'"2 It is further argued that
negligence cannot be inferred in a res ipsa loquitur case, because it is
not within the discretion of the trier of facts whether to accept or reject

16 28S

U.S. at 236.

17 See note 13 supra at 255.
11 Id. at 265.
at 266.
" Id.
., See. e.g., 1ludolph v. Elder, 105 Colo. 105, 95 P.2d 827 (1939): Velotta v. Yampa
Valley Coal Co., 63 Colo. 489. 167 Pac. 971 (1917); wall v. Livezay, 6 Colo. 465 (1882);
Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Miller. 2 Colo. 442 (1874).
2' 101 Colo. 34.
70 P.2d 349 (1937).
2" 328 P.2d at 96.
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the inference. Of course. in jurisdictions where the majority rule is
followed, it is within the discretion of the trier of facts to accept or
reject the inference.' The courts of Colorado in attempting to follow
this landmark decision may find its rule a harsh and rigid one.
See, e.g., Sweeney v.

Iving. 228 U.S. 23"

(1912).
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Vorkmen's Coampfsation-Heart Injury as Compensable Accident
By JAES E. JACKSON

James E. Jackson received his A.B. degree in 1956 from the University of
Missouri, where he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He is a student at the
University of Denver College of Law and is Articles Editor of DICTA.
On April 7, 1955, Frank Ciuba suffered a heart attack while in the
course of his employment. In an action under New Jersey's Workmen's
Compensation Act' he was denied compensation on the ground that
the work causing the injury was no more strenuous than that usually
incident to his employment. On appeal, held: Reversed. The work being
performed need not be unusually strenuous if it was the proximate cause
of the heart injury. Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish and Insulator Co., 141
A.2d 761 (N.J. 1958).
By this decision the New Jersey court has expressly overruled a long
series of cases2 which held that a heart injury must arise out of unusual
exertion to be compensable. As a result New Jersey is now aligned
with a majority of states which hold that any exertion in the course of
employment which produces heart injury creates a compensable accident.' This holding is even more significant in view of the fact that
New Jersey has been considered one of the leading proponents of the
minority rule requiring unusual exertion.'
The rationale of the minority rule is that the heart injury must
be the result of an accident and not the accident itself. Thus, before
an "accident" can be found something unusual in the work must have
occurred. Applying this rule, Michigan has denied compensation for a
heart injury which occurred in performing unusually hard work, since the
alleged accident, i.e., overexertion, was in reality intentional and not
accidental.' This holding seems to be unique since most states that follow
the minority rule will consider a heart injury incurred under such
circumstances to be accidental.'
The minority rule has been severely criticized on three grounds.
First, the requirement that the accident must be the cause of the injury
instead of the injury itself is said to be a misinterpretation of the word
"accident" as usually intended by workmen's compensation acts. 7 Second,
it is said to be erroneous to hold that lifting a 200 pound weight with
a consequent heart injury is an accident while lifting fifty pounds with
the same result is not.' Third, it is said to be obviously impractical to
I N.J.

Stat. Ann.. c. 34. § 15-7 (1937).
Seiken v. Todd Dry Dock. Inc.. 2 N.J. 469, 67 A.2d 131 (1949): Temple v. Storch
Trucking Co., 3 N.J. 42, 68 A.2d 828 (1949); Mannery v. Waters, 8 N.J. Super. 57, 73
A.2d 266 (App. Div. 1950); Franks v. Mack Manufacturing Co., 5 N.J. Super. 1, 68
A.2d 267 (App. Div. 1949): Schroeder v. Arthur Sales Co.. 5 N.J. Super. 287, 68 A.2d
878 (App. Div. 1949); Irons v. New Jersey Dep't of Institutions and Agencies, 3 N.J.
Super. 216, 66 A.2d 44 (App. Div. 1949).
3 See collection of cases in 1 Larson, -Workmen's Compensation Law § 3,S.30, n. 19
(1952). Professor Larson lists as following the majority rule: Ark., Conn., Ga.. Ida.,
Ill., Ind., Kans.. Ky., La., Me., N.M., Okla.. S.C., Tex., Utah. -\\ ash., AN. Va.. and Wris.
4 Id. § 38.64.
Crossweller v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 294 Mich. 443, 293 N._W. 711 (1940).
'Larson, op. cit. supra. note 3, § 38.20-30, n. 18 and 19. The Crossweller case seems
to be ignored even in Michigan. Cf. Schlange v. Blriggs Manufacturing Co., 326 -ich.
552, 40 N.W.2d 454 (1950).
Bohlen, A Problem in Drafting Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv. L. Rev.
328, 337 (1912).
9 Larson, op. cit. supra note 3. § 38.61-63.
2
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determine when exertion is unusual since almost all forms of manual
labor involve tasks of varying degrees of exertion
The effect of the minority rule is a mass of cases with extremely fine
distinctions as to when exertion is unusual. New York, still nominally
committed to the "unusual" test,1" has reached the point where almost
any type of exertion will be termed unusual."
In the instant case the New Jersey court, in overruling its prior
decisions, relied heavily upon English cases "- decided under an act which
is a prototype of the New Jersey act. These cases were decided prior to
the adoption of the New Jersey act, and the court considered their interpretation as having been intended by the legislature. In Clover,
Clayton, and Co. v. Hughes," the court declared that an accident "arises
out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work whatever the degree
of exertion or the condition of health.""
In Colorado the trend represented by the instant case has been
completely reversed. Beginning with Carroll v. Industrial Commission,"
the majority rule was clearly adopted. However, cases subsequent to
Carroll began to use the phrase "overexertion" without expressly overruling Carroll or adopting the unusual circumstances test." In Coors
9Ibid.
'0

Lerner v.

Rump Bros., 241 N.Y. 153, 149 N.E. 334

(1925).

"1 See Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 (1950); Serie v.

F & Mf Schaefer Brewing Co., 273 App. Div. 833, 76 N.Y.S.2d 50 (3d Dep't 1948):
McCormack v. Wood Harmon Warranty Corp., 263 App. Div. 914, 32 N.Y.S.2d 145
(3d Dep't 1942).
12 Fenton v. Thorley, (1903) AC. 443: Clover, Clayton and Co. v. Hughes, (1910)
A.C. 242.
'3 (1910) A.C. 242.
"4 Id. at 247.
15 69 Colo. 473, 195 Pac. 1097 (1921). "By the term 'injury' is meant, not only an

injury the means or cause of which is an accident, but also any injury which
itself an accident."

is

16 Industrial Commission v. McKenna, 106 Colo. 323, 104 P.2d 458 (1940); Industrial Commission v. W\etz, 100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812 (1937); Ellerman v. Industrial
Commission, 73 Colo 20. 213 Pac. 120 (1923).
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Porcelain Co. v. Grenfell," the court created conllusion in the rule by
distinguishing two prior casess on grounds that recovery was had because unusual circumstances had produced the injury. This conclusion
was dictum and seems unwarranted since an examination of the court's
opinion in those cases shows that the Carroll test of usual exertion was
followed." In 1943, the court stated the Colorado rule to be that "overexertion" is required." Then, in Industrial Commission v. International
Minerals and Chemical Corp.,' the court clearly stated the minority
rule, saying, "It has been the consistent holding of this court that in
such cases claimant must prove more than mere exertion attendant upon
the usual course
of the employnmnt, and that overexertion must be
2 established.''
The phrase "overexertion" seems to have created much of the confusion in the Colorado cases. However, except for the International
Minerals case, this confusion is possibly more apparent than real. In
an early case2 " the Colorado court accepted the majority view that any
exertion causing heart injury is overexertion to that particular person.'
Using this definition of overexertion all the cases up to International
Minerals are consisten t.' - However, in that case the word overexertion
is equated with un usual circumstances, which indicates that Colorado
might follow the minority rule. Since the court in InternationalMinerals
quite clearly didn't intend to overrule all its prior decisions,"" it is possible
that the case will not be followed as stating the minority rule which
New Jersey has now expressly repudiated.-"
17 109 Colo. 39, 121 11.2d 669 (1942).
"s Industrial Commission v. Mcl'lenna. 106 Colo. 323, 104 P.2d 458 (1940); Industrial Commission v. \Vetz, 100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812 (1937).
' The
A\etz case dealt with whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a
finding of exertion. The court expressly referred to the exertion as customary in the
work. The McKenna case dealt with whether the work was the proximate cause of
the injury. The unusual exertion was referred to for reasons of proving proximate

cause, and not as a prerequisite for recovery.
20 Black Forest Fox Ranch v. Garret, 110 Colo. 323, 134 P.2d 332 (194.3).

- 132 Colo. 256. 287 P.2d 275 (1955).
Id. at 260, 287 P.2d at 277.
23 U.s. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 96 Colo. 571, 45 P.2d
895 (1935).
" "The defendant bank had Yuenger in its service with his resistance to exertion . . . not an individual with a resistance to exertion denominated as normal

resistance. The important question here is. whether what occurred was overexertion
for him .
I..."
Id. at 579, 45 P.2d at 898.
25 Omitting the dictum of the Coors Porcelain case.
20 The court cites the U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty case as supporting its rule.
See note 23 supra.
27 The denial of recovery in International
lack of proximate cause.

M'\inerals could easily have been based on

